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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN AFGHANISTAN:
THE PROMISE OF MIXED TRIBUNALS
LAURA A. DICKINSON*
In the wake of the September 11 th attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon, how to apprehend, question, and punish the perpetrators remains a
difficult question to answer. Despite the United States-led military response in
Afghanistan, which ousted the Taliban regime, Osama bin Laden and the leaders of
al Qaeda remain at large. United States' forces in Afghanistan captured and then
jailed several hundred suspects on Guantanamo Naval Base, in Cuba, but the
relationship between these suspects and al Qaeda is unclear.' United States allies,
such as Great Britain, France and Germany, also detained individuals suspected of
supporting the September 11 th attacks and other terrorist plots. 2 Even countries
long considered hostile to the United States, such as Syria, have detained and
questioned suspects.' Yet with a few exceptions, most of those apprehended
appear to have played only a minor role, if any, in the September 11 th plot itself.
And on U.S. soil, while authorities had at one point detained over 1,000 people
believed to be involved in the attacks, only a handful appear to have any link at all
to al Qaeda or the September 11 th attacks.4
If capturing suspects has been difficult, the question of how (or whether) to
hold these suspects individually accountable has proven to be even more vexing.
. Associate Professor, University of Connecticut School of Law. This article was presented as part of
the Sutton Colloquium, International Terrorism, Ethnic Conflicts, and Self-Determination, held at the
University of Denver College of Law on March 23, 2002. 1 owe thanks to: Mark Weston Janis, Richard
S. Kay, Harold Hongju Koh, Diane F. Orentlilcher, and Jeremy Paul. I also acknowledge the diligent
research assistance of Cara Cutler and Justine Parker.
1. See 34 More Detainees from Afghanistan Jailed at US. Base, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 2002, at
AI5 (noting that just under 500 prisoners were detained at Guantanamo naval base as of June 13, 2002)
[hereinafter 34 More Detainees]; Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld Backs Plans to Hold Captives Even if
Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at A18 (observing that none of the detainees has been charged
with any crime and reporting statement of top officer in charge of anti-terror intelligence that some of
those being held in Guantanamo "were essentially lost souls who could provide scant intelligence").
2. See, e.g., France Investigates a Terror Suspect, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, at A22; Edmund L.
Andrews, German Officials Find More Terrorist Groups, and Some Disturbing Parallels, N.Y. TIMES,
April 26, 2002, at A12; Alan Cowell, A Suspect's Story; Algerian Pilot Says Detention Has Made Him
a Sept. 11 Victim, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16,2002, at A9.
3. See Steven Erlanger, Germans Say Man Tied to Sept. 11 is in Syria Jail, N.Y. TIMES, JUNE 19,
2002, at A8; James Risen & Tim Weiner, C.I.A. Is Said to Have Sought Help From Syria, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2001, at B3.
4. See Susan Sachs, U.S. Deports Most of Those Arrested in Sweeps after 9/11, N.Y. TIMES, July
11, 2002, at A20; Christopher Drew & Judith Miller, Though Not Linked to Terrorism, Many Detainees
Cannot Go Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2002, at Al.
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The Bush administration has not pursued a consistent course but has, in the main,
eschewed the usual criminal law approaches in favor of military solutions. For
example, the suspects apprehended in Afghanistan and brought to Guantanamo
Naval base are now languishing in legal limbo. The administration asserts that
these detainees, who are not U.S. citizens, will not be tried in U.S. courts. 5 Rather,
administration officials suggest that they will be brought before newly established
military commissions, where they would be afforded fewer rights than would be
provided in ordinary criminal proceedings or even in military courts-martial.6 The
administration has also suggested that some of the Guantanamo detainees might be
returned to their home countries, or, possibly, not tried at all but rather held until
the end of hostilities, whenever that might be.7 At the same time, administration
officials have refused to be strictly bound by the Geneva Convention's
requirements for the treatment of detainees. Indeed, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld has said that the standards imposed by the Conventions will be observed
only "for the most part," and that detainees will not be given individual hearings to
determine whether they should be awarded prisoner of war status. 8
Meanwhile, authorities treat suspects captured in the United States
inconsistently. Zacarias Moussaoui, a non-citizen accused of participating in the
September 11 th plot itself, is being tried in federal district court. 9 But Jose Padilla,
an American citizen suspected of participating in a new al Qaeda plot, was
5. See Katharine Q. Seelye, Rumsfeld Lists Outcomes for Detainees Held in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 27, 2002, at A10.
6. See id. For a comparison of the rights provided to the accused in the proposed military
commissions, those afforded in ordinary criminal trials, and those afforded in courts-martial, see Laura
A. Dickinson, Using Legal Process to Fight Terrorism: Detentions, Military Commissions,
International Tribunals, and the Rule of Law, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1407 (2002); Neal K. Katyal &
Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, Il1 YALE L. J. 1259
(2002).
7. See Dickinson, supra note 6; see also Seelye, supra note 5.
8. See Donald H. Rumsfeld, Department of Defense News Briefing (Jan. 11, 2002) available at
http://www.dod.gov/news/Jan2002/t01 112002_t01 llsd.html (last visited Oct. 21,2002). Rumsfeld also
categorically asserted that the detainees would "be handled not as prisoners of war, because they're not,
but as unlawful combatants," and that no hearings would be held to assess individuals' status, even
though the Geneva Conventions require a "competent" tribunal to make an individualized determination
as to whether a detainee qualifies as a prisoner of war. Id.; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter POW
Convention]. This position was immediately criticized, particularly overseas, as demonstrating that the
"U.S. administration is more at home with an improvised process that sometimes skirts the frontiers of
legality than with international agreements that impose firm reciprocal responsibilities." Stick to the
Prison Rules: The Geneva Convention Protects Us All, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 18, 2002, at 19. The
administration later reversed course and accepted the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, but only
as to Taliban fighters and not al Qaeda members. Katharine Q. Seelye, In Shift, Bush Says Geneva
Rules Fit Taliban Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at AI. Moreover, the administration continues to
maintain that none of the detainees qualify as prisoners or war and that the detainees are not entitled to
individualized hearings to determine their status. This only slightly less extreme position has continued
to draw criticism, including a rare statement of disapproval by the International Committee of the Red
Cross. See Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led Bush to Reverse
Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at AI2.
9. See Indictment Chronicles 'Overt Acts' that it Says Led to Sept. 11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
12, 2001, at B6 (describing Moussaoui indictment).
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transferred to military detention outside of the United States.' 0 Suspects captured
by other governments also face haphazard justice. Some are charged with crimes
and will be tried, while others are simply held and questioned."
Although some commentators support the administration's proposed use of
military commissions,' 2 few condone the indefinite detention of suspects without
any form of adjudicatory procedure. Many criticize the use of the military
commissions altogether, even if limited to suspects captured in the field of battle,
or if established with protections for the rights of the accused.' 3 Critics argue that,
instead, suspects should be tried in existing domestic courts and that no new
institutions are necessary. 14 Others, myself included, have suggested that some
form of international forum would provide the best method for holding at least
those most responsible for the September 11 th attacks accountable for their
actions. 15 Yet in light of this administration's hostility to international processes, it
seems highly unlikely that, despite its advantages, a full-fledged international court
will be used to try those accused of planning and carrying out the September 11th
attacks.
Moreover, the question of where, and how, to try suspects raises a series of
deeper questions about the role of criminal accountability in times of conflict and
war. Scholars writing about the response to the September 11 th attacks note that
the current conflict, between the United-States-led coalition on the one hand, and
terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda on the other, does not fit neatly into either
a "war" paradigm or a "criminal justice" paradigm.' 6 In such circumstances, what
rights and procedures are due to individuals who have engaged in atrocities? What
are the imperatives of victims who demand accountability? Do procedures to
adjudicate individual criminal responsibility have a role to play in containing a
current conflict, in deterring future conflict, or in inculcating norms? Do
international proceedings do a better job of inculcating such norms, or are
domestic processes better suited to that task? Is the effort to promote norms
through international proceedings an exercise in imperialism? In a globalized
world, does it even make sense to refer to international and domestic proceedings
as distinct, or might such processes be better termed transnational?
10. See Katharine Q. Seelye, War on Terror Makes for Odd Twists in Justice System, N.Y. TIMES,
June 23, 2002, at A16.
11. See, e.g., Erlanger, supra note 3; Andrews, supra note 2.
12. See, e.g., Ruth Wedgwood, The Case for Military Tribunals, WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at
Al8.
13. See Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337
(2002); George P. Fletcher, War and the Constitution, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT, Jan. 1-14, 2002, at
26.
14. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 13.
15. See, e.g., Dickinson, supra note 6; Anne-Marie Slaughter, al Qaeda Should Be Tried Before
the World, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, at A23; Richard Goldstone, Prosecuting Al Qaeda: September
11 and Its Aftermath, Crimes of War Project, Dec. 7, 2001, at http://www.crimesofWar.org/expert/al-
goldstone.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002); Michael P. Scharf, Editorial: The Case for an International
Trial ofAl-Qaeda and Taliban Perpetrators of the 9/11 Attacks, Am. Soc'y Int'l L., Spring 2002, at 12.
16. See, e.g., Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 457
(2002).
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Significantly, these questions are precisely the ones that scholars in the
emerging field of transitional justice have been asking over the past decade about
mass atrocities in general. Although these scholars do not focus on the question of
terrorism specifically, they study the ways in which societies that are attempting to
confront past and lingering mass atrocities do so through a variety of means:
criminal trials, truth commissions, civil compensation schemes, lustration
programs, and so on. 17 An exploration of how the insights derived from this body
of work might be applied to the problem of terrorism in the wake of September
11 th would be a fruitful source of further research.
This Essay is an effort to initiate that process by examining an emerging
transitional justice mechanism-the mixed domestic-international tribunal-and
considering the role such tribunals might play in the fight against terrorism. Mixed
tribunals, courts in which international and local judges sit side by side, have
already been used with some degree of success in Kosovo and East Timor, and one
has recently been established in Sierra Leone. The hybrid nature of these courts
may be an advantage when considering issues of accountability in post-Taliban
Afghanistan. A purely domestic process is probably impractical in light of the
limited capacity of the indigenous legal system. And, given the sheer number of
detainees and local distrust of international processes, a hybrid tribunal is more
realistic than the establishment of a purely international court. Moreover, a hybrid
local-international tribunal in this context may be politically palatable even to
those within the Bush administration most in favor of military commissions and
would at least pave the way for some form of multilateral justice mechanism in
response to the September 1 th attacks.
This brief Essay does not attempt to discuss all of these issues in detail.
Instead, I hope to delineate the recent history of this emerging accountability
mechanism and suggest its possible use in the current climate.'8 I will begin, first,
by describing the nature of these tribunals in the most notable post-conflict
contexts in which they have been used: Kosovo and East Timor. Second, I will
compare these hybrid tribunals to international tribunals, on the one hand, and
domestic tribunals, on the other, and explain why, in comparison to each, the
mixed tribunals hold so much promise. Finally, I will discuss the implications of
using such tribunals in a setting such as post-Taliban Afghanistan.
I. Prior Use of Mixed Tribunals
17. See generally, STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN
RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY (1997); ALEX
BORAINE, A COUNTRY UNMASKED (2000); PRISCILLA B. HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS:
CONFRONTING STATE TERROR AND ATROCITY (2001); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND
FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998); RUTI G. TEITEL,
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2002); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: How EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON
WITH FORMER REGIMES (Neil J. Kritz, ed., 1995).
18. For a discussion of hybrid tribunals in the context of other emerging mechanisms for
prosecuting violations of international humanitarian law, see Diane F. Orentlicher, The Future of
Universal Jurisdiction in the New Architecture of Transnational Justice, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION:
NATIONAL COURTS AND PROSECUTION OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (forthcoming 2003).
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In Kosovo and East Timor, the international community worked with local
populations to experiment with a relatively new form of accountability for past
human rights violations: criminal trials before mixed domestic-international courts.
For the most part, these courts emerged as ad hoc solutions in emergency
situations, the product of innovative thinking and collaboration among a variety of
international and local actors forced to make quick decisions and tough
compromises in the face of severe political and economic constraints. In both of
these instances, international actors stepped in to keep the peace in territories
ravaged by conflict and mass atrocity, at a time when detainees suspected of
committing those atrocities were languishing in makeshift detention facilities
without any prospect of trial. Domestic courts were not functioning, and
international courts were either ill-equipped to handle the number of cases at issue,
or were unlikely to be established due to financial or political obstacles. Releasing
the suspects into the general population would have led to violent reprisals, public
outcry, and general mayhem. Under these circumstances, the establishment of
hybrid domestic-international courts appeared to offer a reasonable solution to a
pressing and seemingly intractable problem.
Because these courts are the result of on-the-ground innovation rather than
grand institutional design, the precise form of each tribunal or set of tribunals has
varied considerably. Nonetheless, in both Kosovo and East Timor the courts share
an essential hybrid structure: both the institution and the applicable law consist of a
blend of the international and the domestic. Foreign judges sit alongside their
domestic counterparts to try cases prosecuted and defended by teams of local
lawyers working with those from other countries. These judges apply domestic
law that has been reformed to include international standards. This part discusses
the process by which each hybrid court was established and the form that the court
has ultimately taken.
A. Kosovo
In June of 1999, after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-led
bombing campaign helped halt ethnic cleansing and other mass atrocities
committed primarily by Serb forces against the ethnic Albanian population in
Kosovo, the United Nations Security Council issued a resolution establishing the
United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). 19 UNMIK's mandate required it to
maintain peace and security in the territory: to perform basic civilian
administrative functions (including the establishment of civil law and order), to
coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief, to facilitate the return of refugees, to
promote human rights, to support the reconstruction of key infrastructure, to help
establish substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, and to facilitate a
political process to determine Kosovo's future status. 20 UNMIK's responsibilities
19. S.C. Res. 1244, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess. 4 0 11a mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1244 (1999).
20. See id.; see also United Nations Mission in Kosovo, at http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm
(last visited Oct 21, 2002). The United Nations divided these responsibilities into four groups, two of
which are to be led by non-U.N. organizations, but all of which fall under U.N. jurisdiction: Police and
Justice (United Nations), civil administration (United Nations); democratization and institution-building
(OSCE), and reconstruction and economic development (European Union). See id.
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thus specifically entailed the institution of law and order, which included the
apprehension, trial, and punishment of those who had committed past atrocities as
well as those who committed crimes after the establishment of United Nations
(U.N.) authority.
21
This task was not easily fulfilled. Much of the physical infrastructure of the
judicial system-court buildings, law libraries, and equipment-was destroyed or
severely damaged during the conflict.22 Local lawyers and judges were scarce, and
those available lacked experience, as most ethnic Albanians had been barred from
the judiciary for many years, and Serbian judges and lawyers mostly fled or
refused to serve.23  Detainees suspected of committing atrocities, once
apprehended by U.N. security forces, were crowding prison facilities, with little
prospect of trial.24 Devastated by the conflict and by years of discrimination
against the ethnic Albanian minority, the local judicial system did not have the
capacity or the independence to conduct such trials. Yet the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was also ill-equipped to handle such
cases. The prosecutor for the ICTY made it clear that the international tribunal
was not prepared to try any but those who had committed the worst atrocities on
the widest scale.25 As the detainees continued to languish in prison, many argued
that the continued detention itself violated international human rights standards,
and local frustration with the failure of the judicial process contributed to
increasing ethnic violence.26
To address what was rapidly becoming an accountability and justice crisis,
support grew for the creation of a special court, to be called the Kosovo War and
Ethnic Crimes Court, which was intended to have jurisdiction over war crimes,
other serious violations of international humanitarian law, and serious ethnically-
motivated crimes. 27 The court was to have concurrent jurisdiction with the ICTY,
21. For an overview of efforts to establish the rule of law in post-conflict Kosovo, see Wendy S.
Betts, Scott N. Carlson, & Gregory Gisvold, The Post-Conflict Transitional Administration of Kosovo
and the Lessons-Learned in Efforts to Establish a Judiciary and Rule of Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 371
(2001); Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Making Multilateral Interventions Work: The United Nations and the
Creation of Transitional Justice Systems in Kosovo and East Timor, 25 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 107
(2001) [hereinafter Strohmeyer, Multilateral Interventions]; Hansjrg Strohmeyer, Collapse and
Reconstruction of a Judicial System: The United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 46 (200 1) [hereinafter Strohmeyer, Collapse].
22. See Betts et al., supra note 21, at 376-77.
23. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 49-50, 53.
24. See id
25. See Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the ICTY, Statement on the Investigation and Prosecution
of Crimes Committed in Kosovo, (Sept. 29, 1999) at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p437-e.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2002).
26. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 49. When the UNMIK issued a regulation
allowing for longer pre-trial detention of suspects, the OSCE's Legal System Monitoring Section
concluded that the new regulation was a "clear breach" of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). OSCE LMS, Kosovo:
Report No. 6: Extension of Time Limits and the Rights of Detainees: the Unlawfulness of Regulation
1999/26 (April 29, 2000) available at http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/
report6.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
27. See Betts et al., supra note 21, at 381.
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but to focus on the less high-profile offenders that the ICTY lacked the capacity to
try.28 Yet due to a lack of resources and other political obstacles, the establishment
of the court was repeatedly delayed.29 In an effort to achieve similar results by
different means, U.N. authorities, quietly and with little fanfare, issued a series of
regulations allowing foreign judges to sit alongside domestic judges on existing
local Kosovar courts, while also permitting foreign lawyers to team up with
domestic lawyers to prosecute the cases. 30  The hope was that the infusion of
foreign experts would jump-start the judicial process, providing badly needed
capacity and independence.3 1
As of June 2002, Kosovo courts had held trials in seventeen cases.32 Initially,
international judges had minimal impact, as they did not comprise a majority on
the trial panels. 33 A new UNMIK regulation enacted in December 2000 sought to
rectify this problem, however,34 and after that date all cases of war crimes have
been held in front of courts composed of a majority of international judges, while
prosecution has mostly been undertaken by international prosecutors. 35 The courts
have faced difficulties in finding qualified international personnel to serve as
judges and prosecutors, have been plagued by a lack of funding, and have issued
decisions that commentators have criticized.36  Yet at least one report, though
critical of the tribunals in many respects, suggests that the presence of international
actors has improved the quality of justice delivered in these cases.37
The substantive law applied in these cases was also a blend of the
international and domestic. Initially, with little input from the local population,
UNMIK authorities declared the applicable law in Kosovo to be Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia/Serbian (FRY/Serbian) law, modified to conform to international
human rights standards. 3' This decision outraged many ethnic Albanian Kosovars,
who identified FRY/Serbian law as the law of the oppressive Serbian regime.39
Kosovar Albanian judges refused to apply the law, resulting in widespread
confusion.a In response, UNMIK issued new resolutions describing the applicable
28. See Betts et al., supra note 21, at 381.
29. See Strohmeyer, Multilateral Interventions, supra note 21, at 119.
30. See Betts et al., supra note 21, at 381.
31. See OSCE, Mission in Kosovo, Department of Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Legal
Systems Monitoring Section, Report 9--On the Administration of Justice, at 5-6 (Mar. 2002).
[hereinafter March 2002 OSCE Report].
32. OSCE, Department of Human Rights and the Rule of Law, Legal System Monitoring Section.
Kosovo's War Crimes Trials: A Review, September 2002, available at
http://www.osce.org/kosovo/documents/reports/justice/ (last visited Dec. 26, 2002) [hereinafter
Kosovo's War Crimes Trials].
33. Id.
34. UNMIK Regulation 2000/64, Dec. 15 2000.
35. Kosovo 's War Crimes Trials, supra note 32.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. UNMIK Reg. 1999/1, U.N. Interim Adm. Mission in Kosovo (1999) available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg01-99.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
39. See Strohmeyer, Multilateral Interventions, supra note 21, at 112-13.
40. Id.
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law to be the law in force in Kosovo prior to March 22, 1989.41 But like the initial
decision, the applicable law was to be a hybrid of pre-existing local law and
international standards. Local law was only applicable to the extent that it did not
conflict with international human rights norms.
B. East Timor
East Timor's path to mixed tribunals resembles Kosovo's, though the decision
to use such courts was perhaps more self-conscious. In early September of 1999,
just three months after the U.N. Security Council established the U.N. Mission in
Kosovo, violence erupted in East Timor when nearly 80 percent of the population
voted for independence from Indonesia in a popular consultation. 42 Local militias,
backed by the Indonesian army and opposed to independence, went on a rampage,
killing hundreds of people, raping and injuring many more, looting and burning
public buildings and private homes, and forcing 200,000 people-approximately
one-quarter of the population-over the border into Indonesian West Timor.43 An
Australian-led multi-national force helped to secure peace in the region,44 paving
the way for the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET), established in October of 1999.45 Like UNMIK, UNTAET was
charged with keeping the peace, providing civil administration for the territory,
promoting human rights, supporting relief and reconstruction, and establishing
institutions that would allow for self-government.46 Like UNMIK, a central part of
this mandate consisted of establishing a credible criminal justice system to help
maintain law and order, which included providing meaningful accountability for
serious violations of international humanitarian law that occurred before UNTAET
was established, as well as such crimes committed following the creation of
UNTAET.47
As in Kosovo, an accountability crisis was rapidly developing. The capacity
of the local judiciary was perhaps even weaker than in Kosovo. Very few East
Timorese were trained as lawyers at all, and those that were had no government
experience, as most civil service posts had been reserved for Indonesians.48 The
physical infrastructure of the country had been almost completely destroyed during
the period of looting prior to the arrival of the multi-national force.49 Militia
members suspected of committing mass atrocities were being held in makeshift
41. UNMIK Reg. 1999/24, U.N. Interim Adm. Mission in Kosovo (1999) available at
http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/1999/reg24-99.htm (last visited).; UNMIK Reg. 1999/25, U.N.
Interim Adm. Mission in Kosovo (1999) available at http://www.unmikonline.org/regulations/
1999/reg25-99.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
42. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 46 & n.2.
43. Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor to the Secretary-General,
UN Doc. A/54/726-S/2000/59.
44. S.C. Res. 1264, U.N. SCOR, 4045th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1264 (1999).
45. S.C. Res. 1272, U.N. SCOR, 4057th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1272 (1999).
46. See id.; see also UNTAET Mandate, U.N. Trans'l Adm. in East Timor (1999), available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/UntaetM.htm (last visited Oct 21, 2002).
47. See S.C. Res. 1272, supra note 45.
48. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 50.
49. See id. at 57.
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prison facilities.50 Yet, if no domestic court system existed to allow for meaningful
trials, unlike Kosovo no international court existed either. There was no
counterpart to the ICTY with jurisdiction over East Timor, and while many voices
within the international community and within East Timor have called for the
creation of such a court," the establishment of one seems highly unlikely. 2 In
addition, the members of the Indonesian military suspected of committing
atrocities were not within the jurisdiction of East Timor, and while the newly
democratic Indonesian government has conducted some trials, 3 these trials have
been severely compromised and subject to widespread criticism. 54 Under these
circumstances, the possibility of establishing hybrid courts looked particularly
attractive. The Kosovo experience may have shaped the thinking of UNTAET
officials, as many of the U.N. personnel in UNTAET had spent time in UNMIK."5
Ultimately, UNTAET established a process under which "serious crimes"
were to be tried before three-judge panels, comprised of two international judges
and one East Timorese judge, sitting within the jurisdiction of the District Court of
Dili. 56 "Serious crimes" were defined as "war crimes," "crimes against humanity,"
and "genocide," as well as murder, sexual offenses, and torture, insofar as the latter
50. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 57.
51. See, e.g., Joaquim Fonseca & Yaya San Hak, Prosecution of Crimes under an International
Justice Process, compiled in Justice and Accountability in East Timor: International Tribunals and
Other Options, Report of a one-day seminar in Dili, East Timor, Oct. 16, 2001, at
http://etan.orgilh/misc/justconf4.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002); see also Charles Scheiner, U.N. Rep.
Int'l Fed. for East Timor, Letter to Kofi Annan on the Anniversary of East Timor's Vote Calls for
International Tribunal, Aug. 30, 2001, at http://etan.org/ifet/ifetrib.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
52. See, e.g., Michael J. Jordan, Hopes Dim for International Tribunal in Thoenes Case,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 25, 2002, at 7.
53. See, e.g., UN. Administrator ofE. Timor faults Indonesian Tribunal, ASIAN POL. NEWS, May
7,2001.
54. For a discussion of the Indonesian trials and their deficiencies, see Laura A. Dickinson, The
Dance of Complementarity: Relationships Among Domestic, International, and Transnational
Accountability Mechanisms in East Timor and Indonesia in AVENUES TO ACCOUNTABILITY: NATIONAL
AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES To ATROCITIES (Jane Stromseth ed. forthcoming 2003).
55. For example, Hansjdrg Strohmeyer, who served as the legal adviser to the special
representative of the Secretary-General in Kosovo from June to August 1999, also served as the acting
principal legal adviser to the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor from October
1999 to February 2000 and then as deputy principal legal adviser to the mission until June 2000. See
Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 63 n. al.
56. See Section 10 of UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/11 on the Organization of Courts in East
Timor available at http://www.un.org/peaceletimor/untaetR/Regl l.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002)
[hereinafter Regulation No. 2000/111, which gives to the Dili District Court exclusive jurisdiction over
the most serious crimes, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Regulation No.
2000/11 is further supported by UNTAET Regulation No. 2000/15 on the Establishment of Panels with
Exclusive Jurisdiction for Serious Crimes, promulgated on June 6, 2000 available at
http:llwww.un.org/peaceletimor/untaetR/RegOOI5.pdf (last visited Aug. 27, 2002). For an analysis of
these provisions and the mixed tribunals they establish, see Suzannah Linton, Risingfrom the Ashes: the
Creation of a Viable Criminal Justice System in East Timor, 25 MELB. U. L. REV. 122, 145-73 (2001);
Strohmeyer, Multilateral Interventions and Collapse, supra note 19; Joel C. Beauvais, Note, Benevolent
Despotism: A Critique of UN. State-Building in East Timor, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1101 (2001);
see also UNTAET Press Office, Fact Sheet 7, Justice and Serious Crimes, Dec 2001, available at
http://www.un.org/peace/etimor/fact/fs7.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
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three crimes were committed between January 1, 1999, and October 25, 1999.5
7
Prosecutors and investigators were again drawn from other countries, as well as the
local population.
58
By June of 2002, the serious crimes unit had issued forty-two indictments for
112 individuals and obtained twenty-four convictions.59 Some criticized the initial
indictments, most of which did not include charges of crimes against humanity,
because such comparatively "minor" indictments failed to capture the magnitude
of the crimes committed or the link to the Indonesian forces. 60 However, crimes
against humanity charges have now been brought in a number of cases and have
been added in several cases that initially involved only charges of individual
crimes such as murder.61 The next major trial to occur will involve charges of
crimes against humanity, including acts of imprisonment, torture, inhumane acts,
persecutions, three rapes, and four murders in a series of incidents that allegedly
took play between May and September 1999 in the Lolotoe area near the West
Timor border. Two of the three accused are alleged to have been commanders of
the Kaer Metin Merah Putih militia, and the third was a former village chief. The
trial began on March 4, 2002, and is proceeding at the time of the writing of this
Essay, although it has been suspended several times due to staffing and other
problems.62 The serious crimes unit continues to be hampered by lack of funding,
inexperienced personnel, and vacancies in key positions. For example, the
appellate panel currently cannot function because too few judges have been hired,
and the trial courts have had to suspend proceedings periodically because of a lack
of personnel.63 Nevertheless, despite these problems, trials are proceeding, and it
appears that the hybrid court will continue to play a significant role in the process
of accountability for human rights abuses, even now that East Timor has gained
independence.
II. Analysis of the Advantages and Disadvantages of Hybrid Courts
57. Regulation No. 2000/11 supra note 56.
58. See, e.g., Strohmeyer, Multilateral Interventions, supra note 21, at 118; Sharifah al-Attas,
Picking Up the Pieces, THE NEW STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 21, 2002, at 8 (interview with Malaysian
prosecutor who works for the Serious Crimes Unit Prosecution office noting that other prosecutors
come from Burundi, the United States, England, Brazil, Sri Lanka, and Canada); see also UNTAET
Daily Press Briefing (Jan. 9, 2002), available at www.un.org/peace/etimor/DB/db090102.htm (last
visited Oct. 21, 2002) (announcing arrival of Siri Frigaard, from Norway, to take the position as the new
chief prosecutor for the serious crimes unit).
59. Judicial System Monitoring Program, Summary of Serious Crimes Cases, available at
www.jsmp.minihub.org/trialsnew/htm [hereinafter Summary of Serious Crimes Cases].
60. See, e.g., Linton, Prosecuting Atrocities, supra note 56; Human Rights Watch, Human Rights
Watch World Report 2002: Asia: East Timor, available at http://hrw.org/wr2k2/asia5.html (last visited
Dec. 26, 2002).
61. Summary of Serious Crimes Cases, supra note 59.
62. Id.
63. For an overview of the shortfalls of the special panels, caused in part by scarce resources, see
Richard Dicker, Mike Jendrzejczk & Joanna Weschler, Human Rights Watch, East Timor: Special
Panels for Serious Crimes, Aug, 6, 2002, available at http://hrw.org/press/2002/08/etimor-ltr0806.htm
(last visited Dec. 26, 2002); see also David Cohen, Seeking Justice on the Cheap: Is the East Timor
Tribunal Really a Model for the Future, ASIA PACIFIC ISSUES available at
http://www.ewc.hawaii.edu/stored/pdfs/api061 .pdf (last visited Dec. 26, 2002).
VOL. 3 1:1
MIXED TRIBUNALS IN AFGHANISTAN
The process leading to the establishment of the hybrid domestic-international
courts in East Timor and Kosovo, while somewhat improvised and seriously
under-funded, nonetheless reveals a few potentially enduring positive attributes of
this newly-emerging form of accountability. Of course, the success of any effort to
confront past atrocities, whether through criminal trials, truth commissions, civil
compensation schemes, vetting of public officials, or some combination thereof,
will depend on the particular social, political, and cultural context. The need for
such an effort to confront the past, and the role it might play in establishing peace
and democratic institutions of governance likewise varies considerably depending
on the unique circumstances of each case: there are no cookie-cutter solutions to
these highly complex problems. The Kosovo and East Timor cases share enough
similarities, however, that one can use them to draw a few tentative conclusions
about the promise that mixed tribunals hold in other settings.
Until recently, the primary mechanisms for imposing individual criminal
responsibility for grave human rights abuses fell into two categories. Either new
regimes attempted domestic trials, or the international community established
international tribunals to hold wrongdoers accountable. Both of these approaches,
however, have significant limitations. Such limitations can be conceptualized
along two axes: first, problems of legitimacy, and second, problems of capacity-
building. Focusing on the lessons learned from Kosovo and East Timor, this Part
first outlines the problems of both purely domestic and purely international
tribunals, and then suggests ways in which hybrid domestic-international courts
might address some of these problems.
A. Legitimacy Problems
In some circumstances, hybrid domestic-international courts may have greater
legitimacy in the adjudication of serious human rights crimes than either purely
domestic trials, on the one hand, or purely international processes on the other. In
post-conflict situations, the legitimacy of domestic institutions is often in question.
Of course, the precise nature of the legitimacy crisis varies and is inseparable from
the unique history and culture of a given society. Moreover, different
constituencies viewing the work of any court system may have different ideas
about what constitutes its legitimacy. For example, the factors that establish
legitimacy for national communities may be quite different from those that
underpin legitimacy in the eyes of an international community standing outside a
country and judging its legal process. It is beyond the scope of this brief Essay to
provide a comprehensive overview of the various types of legitimacy problems
facing juridical institutions in post-conflict societies.
Nonetheless, in most cases, to the extent that democratic institutions exist at
all, they typically will have suffered severely during the conflict. With respect to
the judiciary, the physical infrastructure often will have sustained extensive,
crippling damage. In addition, the personnel are often likely to be severely
compromised or lacking in essential skills. Judges and prosecutors may remain in
place from the prior regime that may have backed the commission of widespread
atrocities; the state may continue to employ those who failed to prosecute or
convict murderers or torturers or ethnic cleansers. Alternatively, the new regime
may replace the old personnel almost completely, resulting in an enormous skills
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and experience deficit, as well as the danger of show trials and overly zealous
prosecution for past crimes.
Kosovo and East Timor might be said to represent one type of extreme case.
In both, after the period of conflict that produced mass atrocities, no fully
functioning domestic institutions existed. Indeed, the lack of domestic institutions
led the international community, with the support of large segments of the local
population, to establish an interim transitional administration, run by the U.N. The
purpose of this interim governing entity was to restore peace and stability and to
develop the democratic institutions, including a fully-functioning judiciary,
necessary to pave the way for self-governance. In such circumstances, there is no
clear way to legitimize institutions through a normal political process. Not only is
there no functioning court system, but there are no other political institutions,
executive or legislative, to establish such a system. And if the lack of formal,
institutional legitimacy is difficult to confer on a fledgling justice system, the
establishment of informal legitimacy-broad societal acceptance of institutions-
is even more difficult to establish.
Moreover, in both Kosovo and East Timor, not only was the physical
infrastructure of the legal system severely damaged by the conflict, but the system
was also tainted by the former oppressive regime, undermining public confidence
in, and the broad societal legitimacy of, the system as a whole. Indeed, the justice
systems were run by perceived oppressors, Serbs in the former case and
Indonesians in the latter.64 Ethnic Albanians were systematically excluded from
the system in Kosovo as were East Timorese in East Timor.65
Even if a new local system can be established quickly, over-correction for
these imbalances can create new problems. In the case of Kosovo, for example,
after the conflict, it was easier to appoint ethnic Albanian judges than ethnic
Serbian judges. Only a few Serbian judges were willing to serve, and, responding
to pressure from Belgrade, even those who had been appointed stepped down in
protest.66  Yet without representation of Serbs within the judiciary, the
independence of the decision-making, key to legitimacy among the entire local
population, was severely in question.67 In fact, several judgments imposed against
Serbian defendants by panels of ethnic Albanian judges were later thrown out by
panels that included international judges, due to concerns about lack of due process
and insufficient evidence.68 In East Timor, this was less of a problem because
most of the Indonesians had left, and the overwhelming majority of the population
remaining after the conflict was pro-independence Timorese. 69 Nonetheless, a
64. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 48-50.
65. See id. at 48-53.
66. March 2002 OSCE Report, supra note 31, at 5.
67. See Andrew McKay, Judicial Affairs: Delivering Effective Law and Order, Focus Kosovo,
Oct. 2001, at http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/oct01/focusklawl.htm (last visited Oct. 21,
2002); Multi-Ethnic Justice, Focus KOSOVO, Dec. 2001, http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/
dec01/focuskchron.htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2001).
68. Detentions: A Tale of Two Prison Groups, FOCUS Kosovo, Feb. 2002, at
http://www.unmikonline.org/pub/focuskos/feb02/focusklawl .htm (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
69. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 50-53.
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small segment of the population supported only limited autonomy for East Timor
under the authority of Indonesia, 70 and many of those individuals were the ones to
be put on trial for committing atrocities. 7' Thus, serious questions were raised
about whether they could receive a fair trial under the newly-created Timorese
system. Given these circumstances, in both Kosovo and East Timor, there was
little ability for the local justice system to deliver verdicts perceived to be
legitimate in trials of those suspected of committing mass atrocities.
At the same time, the legitimacy of purely international processes is often
difficult to establish. In the case of Kosovo, an international tribunal-the ICTY-
did exist as a forum to try those few individuals responsible for the most egregious
atrocities. Yet this institution was ill-equipped to address more than a handful of
cases, as international courts undoubtedly always will be. Moreover, establishing
the legitimacy of an international institution within a country that did not support
its creation is quite difficult. The ICTY was established by Security Council
resolution, without the consent of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 72 In light of
the continuing ethnic tensions within the region, the creation of an international
court based at the Hague, removed from the scene of the atrocities and run by
international judges and staff, may have been necessary to create the kind of
independence that would be required to impose individual criminal responsibility
for atrocities on such a large scale. Certainly many segments of the local
population, particularly the predominantly Muslim and Croat victims of the
atrocities, supported the work of the ICTY.73 Yet support within the Serbian
population of any of the countries and regions that now comprise what was the
former Yugoslavia has been more difficult.74 And within all ethnic groups, the
work of the court is often misunderstood.75 In addition, some consider the ICTY
an imposition of Western European powers and the United States and thereby
tainted by imperialism.
76
A recent empirical study of the perceptions of the ICTY within Bosnia and
Herzegovina illustrates the point. 77 The study indicates that a wide cross-section of
lawyers and judges from all ethnic groups and playing different roles within
Bosnian society were ill-informed about the ICTY's work, and were often
suspicious of its motives and its results.78  Possible reasons for this lack of
legitimacy include the location of the tribunal in the Netherlands, far from the local
70. See Beauvais, supra note 56, at 1119-20.
71. Most of the atrocities were committed by pro-autonomy (anti-independence) militias, backed
by Indonesian authorities. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 46.
72. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993); S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993).
73. See The Human Rights Center and the International Human Rights Law Clinic, University of
California, Berkeley, & the Centre for Human Rights, University of Sarajevo, Justice, Accountability,
and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian Judges and Prosecutors, 18 BERKELEY J.
INT'L L. 102, 127-36 (2000) [hereinafter Joint Study].
74. See id. at 129-33.
75. See Joint Study, supra note 73 at 136-39.
76. See id. at 143-47.
77. See id. at 102.
78. See id. at 136-40.
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population, the failure of the ICTY to publicize its work within Bosnia, particularly
within the legal community, the lack of participation of local actors, even as
observers, and the use of predominantly common-law approaches to criminal
justice that were unfamiliar to local legal professionals, trained in a civil law
tradition.79 While no such study exists for Kosovo, similar problems might be
expected there. Of course, over time, the perceived legitimacy of the ICTY may
change as new generations of opinion-makers in the former Yugoslavia come to
view the conflict and its aftermath in new ways. Indeed, the norms articulated by
the ICTY may play a role in shaping such popular perceptions. Nevertheless, at
least in the short term, the ICTY must grapple with ongoing local resistance.
In the case of East Timor, no international tribunal existed to handle even the
most egregious cases. While many voices, both domestic and international, called
for such a tribunal in the immediate aftermath of the atrocities of 1999, the chance
that one will be established is minimal.80
It would be too simple to say that international tribunals have legitimacy with
respect to the international community, but not with respect to local populations.
In fact, the story is always much more complicated. Many segments of the local
population, as in the case of Kosovo and East Timor, often strongly support
international justice in the wake of mass atrocities. Moreover, the international
community does not always support the establishment of such institutions, and
when it does, it is hard to say that there is one, monolithic international
community. In truth there are multiple international communities-for example,
communities of nation-states (such as U.N. members, Security Council members,
NATO countries, the Council of Europe, and the Organization of American
States), communities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (such as human
rights NGOs, humanitarian NGOs, or development NGOs), or communities of
other actors such as corporations, academics, and on and on. Indeed, the division
between the international and the local may make little sense in the globalized era,
when international NGOs partner with local NGOs, foreign governments give aid
to local civil society organizations, and public policy networks routinely bridge
gaps between local and international actors. Nonetheless, despite these
complexities, it does appear that international courts such as the ICTY face greater
obstacles in establishing local legitimacy in the places from which the accused
perpetrators come than in establishing legitimacy within broader international
communities.
B. Capacity-building problems
Purely domestic and purely international institutions also often fail to promote
local capacity-building processes. In post-conflict situations, the need to develop
local capacity in the justice sector is often an urgent problem. Kosovo and East
Timor provide extreme examples. In both cases, the conflict virtually eliminated
the physical infrastructure of the judiciary; court buildings, prisons, and equipment
79. See Joint Study, supra note 73 at 14447.
80. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 52.
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were destroyed.8' But even more devastating than the physical loss was the loss in
human resources. In Kosovo, only Serbs had the experience and training to work
as judges and prosecutors, yet these Serbs often refused to work in the new system
because doing so would constitute a betrayal of their ethnic heritage.8 2 Albanians
had some training but little experience, because they had been almost completely
excluded from the system for many years.83 In East Timor, the capacity deficit
was even more severe, as the Indonesians, who had staffed the judiciary and had
essentially excluded the local Timorese from serving, had evacuated, and few
Timorese had any legal training or experience.84 Indeed, no East Timorese judges
or prosecutors existed until UNTAET made its first appointments in 2000.85 Under
such circumstances, a domestic system cannot be established for a significant
period of time, due to extreme lack of capacity in the local sector.
A purely international process that excludes local participation does not help
build local capacity. An international court staffed by foreigners, or a justice
system run by the U.N. transitional administration, also staffed by foreigners, does
little to train local actors in necessary skills. In short, local actors cannot run the
system themselves, but a system run by the international community does not help
improve the capacity of the local population.
C. Advantages of Mixed tribunals
Mixed tribunals, as suggested by their use in Kosovo and East Timor, can
offer at least partial responses to both these legitimacy and capacity problems. The
sharing of responsibilities among international and local actors in the
administration of justice, particularly with respect to accountability for serious
human rights crimes, can help to establish the legitimacy of the process as well as
strengthen the capacity of local actors.
In Kosovo and East Timor, the addition of international judges and
prosecutors to cases involving serious human rights abuses may have enhanced the
legitimacy of the process, at least to some degree, both with respect to the local
population and the international community. In both Kosovo and East Timor, the
initial failure of U.N. authorities to consult with the local population in making
governance decisions generally, and decisions about the judiciary specifically,
sparked public outcry. Without normal political processes in place, of course,
consultation is inherently difficult. When no elected officials exist to give advice,
and civil society is badly damaged by years of oppression and conflict, there are no
easy answers to the question of who should be consulted without creating
impressions of bias. Nonetheless, in both circumstances, the appointment of
foreign judges to domestic courts to sit alongside local judges, and the appointment
of foreign prosecutors to team up with local prosecutors, helped to create a
framework for consultation that may have enhanced the general perception of the
81. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 49-51.
82. See Strohmeyer, Collapse, supra note 21, at 49-51.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 50.
85. See Linton, supra note 56, at 133-34.
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institution's legitimacy. By working together and sharing responsibilities,
international and local officials necessarily consulted with each other.
At the same, time the appointment of international judges to the local courts
in these highly sensitive cases helped to enhance the perception of the
independence of the judiciary and therefore its legitimacy within a broad cross-
section of the local population. In Kosovo this was most apparent, as the previous
attempts at domestic justice had failed to win any support among Serbs. 6 Indeed,
Serbian judges refused to cooperate in the administration of justice, and the
verdicts in the cases tried by ethnic Albanians were regarded by the ethnic Serbian
population as tainted. 7 In contrast, the verdicts of the hybrid tribunals garnered
some support, even among Serbs.88
The sharing of responsibilities among local and international officials is not a
complete cure for legitimacy problems, of course. Indeed, such hybrid
relationships can raise new questions about who is really controlling the process.
When international actors wield more power than local officials-when the
majority of judges on a given panel is international, for example, or when the local
prosecutors merely serve as deputies to international prosecutors-some may
charge that the international actors control the process, and that such control
smacks of imperialism. In East Timor, some local actors involved in the criminal
justice process criticized the mixed tribunal on these grounds.89 On the other hand,
too little international control may lead to concerns about the independence and
impartiality of overly locally-controlled processes.90 And the devil is, of course,
often in these details. Nonetheless, the shared arrangement does offer more
promise of working out these difficulties than a purely international or a purely
domestic process.
The mixed process offers advantages in the arena of capacity-building as well.
The side-by-side working arrangements allow for on-the job training that is likely
to be more effective than abstract classroom discussions of formal legal rules and
principles. 9' And the teamwork can allow for sharing of experiences and
knowledge in both directions. International actors have the opportunity to gain
greater sensitivity to local issues, local culture, and local approaches to justice at
the same time that local actors can learn from international actors.
To be sure, hybrid courts face difficulties in capacity-building. A lack of
resources has proven to be the most serious problem so far. In both Kosovo and
East Timor, the hybrid courts have been given an enormous mandate without
86. March 2002 OSCE Report, supra note 31 at 6.
87. See id. at 5-6.
88. See id.
89. See Linton, supra note 56, at 150.
90. See March 2002 OSCE Report, supra note 31, at 6. Efforts to establish a mixed tribunal in
Cambodia initially stalled due to an inability to agree about the balance of international and local
control. See Seth Mydans, U.N. Ends Cambodia Talks on Trials for Khmer Rouge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9,
2002, at A4. Nevertheless, an accord has now been reached. See Seth Mydans, UN. and Cambodia
Reach an Accordfor Khmer Rouge Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,2003, at A5.
91. See Beauvais, supra note 56, at 1157-1159.
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receiving sufficient funding to carry out that mandate. Court personnel lack even
the most basic equipment necessary for them to do their jobs, translators and other
administrative personnel are in short supply, and, perhaps most significantly, the
courts have had trouble attracting and retaining qualified international personnel to
fill posts as judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel.92 To the extent that hybrid
courts are touted as a means of doing justice on the cheap, and then deprived of
even the most basic resources, they cannot fulfill their potential.
Nonetheless, such concerns about funding are issues more of implementation
than conception. And, of course, lack of resources can be a problem regardless of
the legal framework adopted. In the end, perhaps the greatest indication of the
promise of mixed tribunals is found in the support they garner. The U.N. has
advanced similar efforts elsewhere. After many years of efforts, an accord has
been reached to create a hybrid domestic/international court in Cambodia, 93 and
the project to establish a free-standing hybrid court in Sierra Leone is well
underway. 94 Even within the Bush Administration, which is generally resistant to
the idea of international justice, there is strong support for mixed domestic-
international tribunals such as the proposed special court for Sierra Leone.
III. Hybrid Courts in Afghanistan?
The potential of hybrid courts to address some of the problems of
accountability for mass atrocities in settings such as Kosovo and East Timor
suggests that such courts could at least be considered in other circumstances. Of
course, there are no uniform solutions to difficult problems of transitional justice,
and a mechanism that has found success in one context cannot simply be imported
to another. The outlook for the use of such courts is promising, however, and
should be considered in future post-conflict situations. This last Part considers
whether the use of such courts might make sense in post-Taliban Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, as in Kosovo and East Timor, the international community
intervened to help a country make a transition to democracy after a period of
oppression and widespread human rights abuses. Of course, in Afghanistan, the
primary motivation for the international intervention was to halt the terrorist
activities of the al Qaeda network, which was extensively supported by the Taliban
regime. Although the Taliban committed human rights abuses on a grand scale for
many years, it was only after the attacks of September 11 th that a U.S.-led
multilateral military force intervened in the country, putting an end to the regime.
Moreover, the ongoing commitment of the U.S. to nation-building in Afghanistan,
in the wake of the military intervention, remains unclear. 95 Nonetheless, U.S.
92. See, e.g., Beauvais, supra note 56, at 1160; Dickinson, supra note 54; Linton, supra note 56,
at 149; Kosovo's War Crimes Trials, supra note 32.
93. See Mydans, UN. and Cambodia Reach an Accord for Khmer Rouge Trial, supra note 90, at
A5.
94. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4186th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000),
available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N0O/605/32/PDF/N0060532.pdf (last visited
Oct. 21, 2002).
95. In April, Bush appeared to reverse his pre-September I 1"' opposition to nation-building when
he called for a new Marshall Plan to rebuild Afghanistan. See James Dao, Bush Sets Role for US. in
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officials, as well as those from other governments who participated in the military
intervention, and the international community more broadly, support efforts to
promote peace and build democratic institutions in Afghanistan, goals similar to
those articulated in Kosovo and East Timor.% If for no other reason, there is a
widespread consensus that building rule of law in Afghanistan will make the
region a less fertile breeding ground for future generations of terrorists.97
Indeed, the goals of promoting peace in Afghanistan by supporting the justice
sector and ensuring accountability for human rights crimes intersect and overlap
with the fight against terrorism. Establishment of rule of law institutions is critical
to building a society where terrorism is an unacceptable option. Moreover, the
attacks of September 11 th could themselves be characterized as crimes against
humanity, serious violations of international law that warrant individual criminal
accountability.
As in Kosovo and East Timor, the success of these rule of law efforts depends
on the establishment and development of a functioning judicial system. While the
international community is not itself taking temporary charge of the civil
administration, international support for the local justice system will be critical to
ensuring its effectiveness. An important task for Afghan courts will be to hold
those on all sides accountable for violations of the laws of armed conflict, as well
as to try those responsible for serious crimes and human rights violations during
the Taliban regime. Meaningful accountability and fair proceedings will not be
possible without a significant contribution of funding and expertise by the
international community. As part of that effort, a hybrid court, with domestic
Afghan judges sitting alongside judges from other countries, could be established
to try those accused of human rights crimes and violations of the laws of armed
conflict.
The experience of using such courts in Kosovo and East Timor, where the
hybrid process may have helped to address some of the legitimacy problems of
purely international or purely local justice, suggests that they hold promise in a
place such as Afghanistan where external solutions are often greeted with
suspicion, but internal solutions are not workable. Like Kosovo and East Timor,
there is a growing accountability crisis, with thousands of suspects imprisoned
around the country in makeshift jails in poor conditions. 98 The United States took
Afghan Rebuilding, N.Y. TIMES, April 18, 2002, at Al [hereinafter Dao, Bush Sets Role]. In practical
terms, however, it is far from clear that the administration is actively supporting robust nation-building.
For example, the administration has not supported the expansion of the international security force in
Afghanistan, currently only operating within Kabul, even though Afghan President Karzai and many
humanitarian groups say such expansion is necessary for peace, security, and reconstruction of the
country. James Dao, Lawmakers Urge Bush to Expand Afghan Force Beyond Kabul, N.Y. TIMES, June
27, 2002, at Al1 [hereinafter Dao, Lawmakers Urge Bush].
96. See Dao, Bush Sets Role, supra note 95.
97. See Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, Remarks at
Symposium, Reluctant Nation-Building: Securing the Rule of Law in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 17
CONN. J. INT'L L. 433 (2002).
98. David Johnston & James Risen, US. Seeks DNA of All Captives in Afghan War, N.Y. TIMES,
March 3, 2002, at Al (noting that 7,500-8,000 captured fighters are being held throughout
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several hundred of these suspects into custody and brought them to Guantanamo
naval base, 99 but it is estimated that many more remain detained in Afghanistan.' °°
Their ongoing detention will undoubtedly continue to contribute to instability and
unrest within Afghanistan, and it is unclear to what extent there are reasonable
grounds to believe the detainees actually engaged in violations of international
humanitarian law, committed human rights crimes, or were involved in terrorist
acts, and to what extent they simply were captured as Taliban fighters. Yet the
release of the suspects, without investigation or trial, could lead to even greater
unrest.
In addition, such hybrid courts could aid in capacity-building. Currently,
there is no centralized Afghan justice system. Justice in Afghanistan has been
predominantly local, religious and tribal, in large part because the central state was
weak and the country was in a virtually perpetual state of conflict for decades. ° l
In addition, as in Kosovo and East Timor, the physical infrastructure of the court
system has been decimated by conflict. 10 2 And during the Taliban regime, as in the
regimes in Kosovo and East Timor prior to international intervention, large
segments of the population have been excluded from the legal system. 10 3 As a
result, the court system is extremely weak, and there is little prospect for trial of
these suspects in state-run courts.1°4
Accordingly, an international-domestic hybrid court will be necessary if for
no other reason than the sheer numbers of people awaiting trial. Moreover, as the
Kosovo and East Timor experiences have made clear, support for the establishment
of a strong judiciary is an essential foundation for lasting peace. 10 5 A hybrid
domestic/international structure for some courts and for some prosecution efforts
helps to provide both a vehicle for training of, and consultation with, the local
population and helps to establish a degree of independence in cases involving
intense ethnic conflicts and rivalries. Such a model may well be highly useful in
Afghanistan, and important lessons can be learned from mistakes in Kosovo and
East Timor. Certainly, in order to be successful, significant financial resources are
required.
Finally, such a hybrid judicial process could provide the best way of assuring
accountability and providing for a measure of deterrence for terrorism, human
rights crimes, and violations of the laws of armed conflict. Moreover, while the
United States might be unlikely to accept such a process for trying Taliban or al
Qaeda leaders, it might be willing to accept and support such trials for low-level
Afghanistan).
99. See 34 More Detainees, supra note 1.
100. See Johnston & Risen, supra note 98.
101. See William Spencer, Remarks at Symposium, Reluctant Nation-Building: Securing the Rule
of Law in Post-Taliban Afghanistan, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 445 (2002).
102. See id.
103. See id.
104. See id.; see also U.S. INST. OF PEACE, REBUILDING AFGHANISTAN: A FRAMEWORK FOR
RESTORING SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW, January 15, 2002, at http://www.usip.org/
roI/afghan mainreporthtml (last visited Oct. 21, 2002).
105. See Betts et al., supra note 21.
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
Taliban or al Qaeda operatives.
I should note that I am not suggesting that hybrid domestic-international
tribunals could be, or should be, the only forum in which to hold suspected
terrorists accountable for their actions. Other domestic, transnational, and
international accountability mechanisms still have a role to play. Indeed, as noted
previously, if a hybrid court in Afghanistan were established, it would probably be
best-suited for trying lower-level al Qaeda and Taliban operatives for crimes
committed on Afghan soil (or with at least a link to Afghanistan). As between a
hybrid court within Afghanistan and other Afghani courts, distinctions could be
based on the types of crimes committed, using the East Timor and Kosovo models.
Relevant crimes might include crimes against humanity, violations of the laws of
armed conflict, and perhaps crimes of international terrorism as defined under
existing terrorism conventions. Because the hybrid court could also serve the goal
of ensuring more general accountability for serious human rights abuses committed
before or during the Taliban regime, as well as abuses associated with the Northern
Alliance insurgency itself, the court should have a relatively broad mandate to hear
other Afghanistan-based human rights crimes as well.
More broadly, this brief discussion of mixed domestic-international tribunals
demonstrates one way in which the growing scholarship on transitional justice may
be useful in considering various approaches to the task of ensuring accountability
for terrorism and assessing the importance and impact of such approaches.
Transitional justice scholars have amassed a body of knowledge concerning the
wide variety of mechanisms both for establishing rule of law institutions that will
be broadly accepted as legitimate and helping to develop the capacity of local
justice systems, all while trying to secure the stability of a fragile new regime.
This body of knowledge is a crucial resource in efforts to combat terrorism
because it is only through a combination of accountability and the establishment of
rule of law that we will have a chance of holding the forces of terror in check. As
we consider various models of justice in the aftermath of the September 11 th
attacks, the lessons learned elsewhere about forging justice after mass atrocity
provide a fertile ground for creative innovation.
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